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 Executive Summary  
 
In the short space of five years, Lesotho’s clothing industry grew from six factories to 
40, from exporting $140 million worth of garments in 2000 to $391 million in 2005.  
The duty-free privileges, and at the time the quota-free privileges as well, offered under 
the United States’ AGOA regime attracted investors from Asia and South Africa and 
sparked the dramatic rise in garment factories, employment in those factories, and 
exports. However, a change in the international conditions in the garment industry and a 
significant appreciation of the currency have caused the industry to contract.   
 
The major shift in international condition occurred in January 2005.  The Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA) and its successor the Agreement and Textiles and Clothing (ATC), 
the international agreements that governed the apparel quota system for 50 years, 
expired 31 December 2004.  The MFA was one Lesotho’s attractions; the country had 
unfilled quota.  Quotas no longer restrain China, India, and Vietnam from 
manufacturing unlimited garments.  These countries have lower costs than sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries; buyers and retailers are leaving SSA to place orders in Asia.   
 
Besides quota-free access, Lesotho was able to attract foreign investment due to its 
advantageous exchange rate with the US dollar, duty-free access to the United States 
granted under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), low wages, access to 
South Africa’s transportation system, and relatively stable political environment.  These 
advantages are rapidly disappearing.  Since 2003, the Maloti, pegged to the Rand, has 
since appreciated in value against the dollar.  Thus, wage costs, in dollars, have almost 
doubled (nominally) over the past three years.  At the same time, worker productivity, 
as reported by factory managers, has not significantly increased despite the 10-year 
presence of the industry in Lesotho.   
 
Lesotho, as a lesser-developed country (LDC), is able to import fabric from Asia under 
the third country fabric provision of AGOA to be used in the manufacturing of garments 
exported to the US.  This provision, which allows Lesotho duty-free access to its major 
market, expires in September 2007.  After September 2007, factories in Lesotho must 
use fabric made in SSA or the United States to receive duty-free entry.   
 
Lesotho exports almost entirely to the US, making it heavily dependent on one market.  
The EU market also offers an opportunity, but duty-free access to Lesotho is blocked by 
stringent rules of origin, which requires that garments eligible for duty-free entry must 
be made from fabric made in Lesotho.  Although Lesotho currently has a denim fabric 
mill that supplies jeans manufacturers, the majority of Lesotho’s factories use knit 
fabric, for which there is no mill in Lesotho.  The introduction of a knit fabric mill is 
key for the industry in Lesotho, not only to access the European markets, but also to 
shorten lead times importing fabric from Asia, and to continue to access the US market 
should the third country fabric provision expire. 
 
Keeping factories in Lesotho is proving a difficult task due to these changing 
conditions.  Eight factories have already left Lesotho, finding it too difficult to compete 
with China, Vietnam, and Cambodia given the current conditions.  Approximately 
10,000 workers have been laid off as factories close or lay-off workers. Protected from 
the international market by quotas and tariff preferences, producers in Lesotho never 
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upgraded their operations to face the new post-MFA competition.  Now they are facing 
the consequences.   
 
The government of Lesotho has instituted several policies to assist firms in staying in 
Lesotho.  The Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) assists existing 
industrialists with bureaucratic and infrastructural problems as well as attracts new 
investment.  The government led a delegation of ministries and industrialists to the US 
to encourage the US government to extend AGOA as well as speak to major buyers like 
Gap and Levi Strauss.  To assist factories with their bottom lines, the government 
instituted a duty-credit certificate scheme (DCCS) to rebate import duties on raw 
materials.  Firms interviewed for this project have confirmed that this is one of the 
major reasons why the clothing firms have been able to stay in Lesotho.  
 
Several key conclusions can be drawn from this project:  
 
1. The significance of China’s global economic expansion cannot be 
underestimated in terms of its impact on Lesotho’s clothing and textile industry. 
 
2. The major competitive threats to the industry therefore lie in the developing 
world and not in the industrialised world. 
 
3. Given the rapid growth of the garment sector in Lesotho and its importance to 
output, balance of payments, job creation, and income distribution, any changes 
will have significant repercussions with respect to high unemployment and 
serious poverty observed in the country.   
 
4. Without duty free access through AGOA to Lesotho’s major market, the United 
States, the clothing industry is likely to suffer severely.  
 
5. The sustainability of the industry requires firms in the industry becoming more 
internationally competitive to compete effectively with Asian 
producers.   Government proposals to assist firms should include firm learning, 
clustering, and worker training.   
 
6. Improvement of the physical infrastructure, in particular the water system, is 
essential for attracting knit fabric mill investors and thus the creation of an 
integrated value chain within Lesotho.   
 
7. An integrated value chain (e.g. a knit fabric mill) would allow Lesotho to 
enhance its competitiveness against its Asian rivals in terms of lead times and 
access to the US market should the third country fabric provision expire in 
September 2007.   
 
8. Bureaucratic infrastructure needs to be improved to smooth customs clearances, 
company registration, and visa and residency permit applications.     
 
9. The existing exchange rate tied to the South African Rand does not assist the 
clothing exporters in Lesotho who find it very difficult to compete without high 
degrees of preferences in global markets.   
 
We have not yet seen the full impact of China on Lesotho.  Firms in Lesotho need to 
prepare themselves for tremendous international pressure and competition.   
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1 Introduction  
 
Since 2000, Lesotho along with Kenya, Madagascar and Swaziland, has seen year-to-
year doubling of clothing exports to the United States under the AGOA program.  These 
SSA countries have experienced tremendous growth in the clothing industry mainly 
because of AGOA duty-free benefits, but also due to advantageous exchange rates with 
the US dollar.  However, on 31 December 2004, the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), 
the quota system that restricted Chinese exports to developed countries ended, freeing 
China and other large producers from binding quotas.  Dire predictions were made 
about the end of the clothing industry in SSA, which accounted for 3% of global 
garment exports in 2004.  The winners would be China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where 
global garment production would concentrate.  Indeed, eight factories in Lesotho have 
closed, leaving 5,800 unemployed.  Their closure has been attributed to a lack of orders 
as retailers source their garments elsewhere and to the appreciation of the Rand against 
the dollar. With layoffs at other factories, the total number of jobs lost is 10,700.  
 
The objectives of this study are to investigate and analyse policy and other responses of 
the Lesotho government to the liberalisation of the clothing and textile industry, with a 
focus on the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Included should be an examination of 
whether the utilisation of preferential measures (AGOA, ‘Everything but Arms’, 
Cotonou) will have any ameliorating effects.” 
 
The primary focus therefore of the paper is addressing the policy issue of what can be 
done to assist the firms remaining in Lesotho.  This project investigates what the 
government in Lesotho has done in the build up to the end of the MFA as well as what 
strategies are available to the government to cement the industry in Lesotho for the 
future.  In order to do this we conducted a number of interviews with firms, 
stakeholders and government officials in Lesotho. 
1.1 Methodology 
  
In January 2006, interviews in Lesotho were conducted for this project.  A total of seven 
manufacturers, two government officials, one industry association, one sourcing agent, 
and one key industry informant were interviewed (Table 1).  The seven manufacturers 
interviewed represent 51% of the employment in the industry.  One jean and six knit 
manufacturers were interviewed.   
Table 1: Firms Interviewed in January 2006 







Knit Firms 6 30 13,350 20,924 
Woven Firms 1 9 6,000 14,754 
Total 7 39 18,350 35,678 
 Source for total Lesotho data: LNDC 
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2 The Context: The Global Clothing and Textiles 
Industry 
 
The clothing and textile industry has increasingly become globalised.  In 2004, clothing 
and textiles were one of the world’s most traded products, with total exports being 
valued at $453 billion.  The textile and clothing industry is particularly suited to global 
production networks because the clothing value chain is compartmentalized: most 
apparel products can be exported at each separate stage along the apparel value chain, 
making the sector highly trade intensive and sensitive to a country’s trade regime 
(Gereffi and Memedovic 2003). Furthermore, clothing production is mostly labour-
intensive yet requiring low skill levels, making the industry suited to developing 
economies.  In contrast, textiles production is far more capital-intensive; developing 
countries, which lack capital investment, have encountered difficulties in creating 
backward linkages in the textiles supply chain (Morris et al, 2005).   
 
The garment value chain is buyer-driven, meaning that the final retailer or buyer 
determines the product it will sell in stores, rather than the producers or manufacturer 
dictating product design and characteristics.  Buyers and retailers have control of the 
chain.  But they are affected by constant change in business processes and consumer 
demand.  There have been several major changes, identified by McCormick and 
Schmitz (2002).  First, no longer do retailers keep huge stocks, practising ‘just-in-case’ 
retailing, but instead find it cheaper to keep low inventories and practise ‘just-in-time’ 
ordering.  Thus, time to market is key as stock is no longer held in warehouses, but sent 
directly to stores.  Manufacturers must be able to deliver on time.   
 
In addition, consumers are demanding cheaper products, but shopping more frequently 
and buying more clothes (Nordas, 2004).  To accommodate this change in demand, 
retailers now have more seasons and shorter runs in those seasons (McCormick and 
Schmitz 2002).  For manufacturers, this means that they are forced to compete on price, 
and must get more orders from buyers as orders are smaller than in the past.  It is 
typically in developing economies that we find garment manufacturing facilities as costs 
are generally lower there, in particular labour costs. To be able to compete in a world 
where price pressures determine orders, manufacturers typically absorb the lower prices 
by reducing their margins or by increasing worker productivity.  
 
It is important to understand the three major factors that have spread garment 
production to so many different countries, including countries in SSA. The first is the 
increasing concentration of buyers with consequences for global governance. The 
garment value chain has been characterised by a concentration of retailers and buyers, 
particularly in the US in the last few years.  Walmart alone represents 20% of demand 
in the US retail market (Frontline, 2004).  The five major US retailers, Walmart, Sears’, 
Kmart, Dayton Hudson Corp, and JC Penny’s, combined control 68% of apparel sales 
(Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003).  By 2010, the top 10 retailers are expected to control 
25 – 30% of world textile and clothing trade (KSA Associates as quoted in Manchester 
Trade Team 2005).  Buyer concentration results in orders of large volumes and, of 
course, low prices. This makes it difficult for small scale suppliers to meet the 
requirements of large global buyers within time period demanded.  This has advantaged 
countries such as China with large volume plants, and transnational companies (often 
based in Hong Kong or Taiwan) who have a competitive advantage in organising large 
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scale production runs. Consequently the concentration of power in the hands of a few 
retailers gives them considerable control over manufacturers within the garment value 
chain and leaves manufacturers with little clout to obtain high prices (Morris et al 
2005).   
 
The second major explanation for the structure of global production has been costs and 
efficiency. Although the clothing industry has become increasingly characterised by the 
requirement for shorter lead times, greater inter- and intra-seasonal variety and tighter 
logistics (USITC, 2004; Kaplinsky, 2005), cost has been king in this industry. In 2004, a 
US International Trade Commission (USITC) enquiry into competitiveness in the global 
textiles and clothing industry provided a comprehensive overview of emerging trends 
based in part on a series of country case studies conducted by industry experts. It 
concluded that China is “expected to become the ‘supplier of choice’ for most U.S. 
importers (the large apparel companies and retailers) because of its ability to make 
almost any type of textile and apparel product at any quality level at a competitive 
price”. The USITC concluded that China’s low unit labour costs were due to a 
combination of low wages and high productivity. As for quality, it is “considered by 
industry [to be] among the best in making most garments and made-up textile articles at 
any quality or price level” (USITC 2004: xi and xiii).  
 
The third and most important factor is the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) and its 
successor, the Agreement on Clothing and Textiles (ATC).  The MFA was a system of 
quota restrictions placed on all countries by the US and European countries to try to 
limit imports to protect their own industries.  Instead of halting the production power of 
Asian countries as intended, manufacturers in Japan, Korea and Taiwan over time 
spread out their production networks to other countries in the region to take advantage 
of other countries’ unfilled quotas (Kaplinsky, 2005).  
 
This quota-based preferential trade access meant that production spread to an ever-
increasing number of countries. This was largely because firms in quota-full economies 
organised garment production in under-utilised quota producer countries. Thus, during 
the 1990s, a rapid process of third party organising and supply sourcing functions 
spread throughout the developing world to provide access to established markets. Hong 
Kong garment producers opened factories in Mauritius and elsewhere, and Korean and 
Taiwanese producers spread their operations to the Caribbean and to sub-Saharan 
Africa. In turn, as they matured in their operations and established their own footholds, 
Mauritian garment producers also spread their operations to Madagascar. In more recent 
years, large Asian producers, especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan, developed the 
capacity to mobilise and coordinate full-package manufacture (i.e. all the manufacturing 
stages) in the global textile and clothing value chain, leading to what Gereffi (1999) 
termed “triangular production networks.” In other words, production in one country 
(usually least developed) was organised and coordinated by firms in another (mostly 
middle-income) country, with products produced sold on to final buyers in yet a third 
(usually industrialised) economy.  
 
Competition between countries arose as labour and transportation costs as well as 
proximity to market increasingly played an important part.  Manufacturers could easily 
shut down a factory in one country to open again in another, forever seeking cheaper 
wages and better access to markets.  This resulted in manufacturers in developing 
countries competing against each other and in particular against China, bidding down 
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wages and production costs.  Meanwhile, clothing production in Northern countries 
decreased as wages there made them uncompetitive; this shift was particularly marked 
in the 1990s.  In 1992, 49% of apparel sold in the US was made there; by 1999, just 
12% was ‘Made in the USA’ (Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003). 
   
China is substantially the world’s largest clothing exporter, increasing the value of its 
clothing exports by 540% from $9.7 billion in 1990 to $61.9 billion in 2004 (Table 2). 
In 1990, China accounted for only 9% of the world’s total clothing exports, but by 
2004, its share had increased to 24%, and if Hong Kong (10%) is included, China 
effectively accounted for one third of world clothing exports. Although Italy grew 
clothing exports by 51% between 1990 and 2004, its share of world exports declined 
from 11% to only 7%. Mexico and India are the only other countries among the top 10 
exporters that have been able to increase their world share. India’s clothing exports 
grew by 162% (from $2.5 billion to $6.6 billion) between 1990 and 2004, increasing its 
share of world total exports from 2% to 3%. 
 
Table 2: World trade in clothing by top 10 countries (US$ million) 
Exports Clothing % World Total 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1990-
2004 %  
change 1990 2004 
China 1,625 2,450 9,669 24,049 36,071 36,650 41,302 52,061 61,856 540% 9% 24% 
Hong Kong 4,976 6,718 15,406 21,297 24,214 23,446 22,343 23,152 25,097 63% 14% 10% 
Italy 4,584 5,320 11,839 14,424 13,384 14,220 14,643 16,191 17,925 51% 11% 7% 
Germany 2,882  7,882 7,530 7,320 7,444 8,338 9,749 11,221 42% 7% 4% 
Turkey 131 1,208 3,331 6,119 6,533 6,661 8,057 9,937 11,193 236% 3% 4% 
France 2,294 1,935 4,671 5,659 5,414 5,469 5,882 6,935 7,865 68% 4% 3% 
Mexico 2  587 2,731 8,631 8,012 7,751 7,343 7,197 1126% 1% 3% 
India 673 930 2,530 4,110 6,179 5,484 6,037 6,459 6,620 162% 2% 3% 
Belgium     3,941 4,206 4,649 5,353 6,235  0% 2% 
USA 1,263 785 2,565 6,651 8,629 7,012 6,032 5,537 5,059 97% 2% 2% 
World 40,590  108,129 158,353 197,498 194,490 202,310 225,940 258,097 139% 100% 100% 
Imports Clothing 
USA 6,943 16,202 26,977 41,367 67,115 66,391 66,731 71,277 75,731 181% 24% 28% 
Germany 8,326  20,411 24,550 20,183 19,330 19,647 22,219 24,076 18% 18% 9% 
Japan 1,537 2,012 8,737 18,758 19,709 19,186 17,602 19,485 21,687 148% 8% 8% 
UK 2,858 2,694 6,961 8,002 12,995 13,169 14,657 16,551 19,245 176% 6% 7% 
Hong Kong 695 1,671 6,913 12,654 16,008 16,098 15,640 15,946 17,129 148% 6% 6% 
France 2,637 2,707 8,381 10,639 11,412 11,769 12,402 14,771 16,791 100% 7% 6% 
Italy 797 779 2,580 4,703 6,139 6,697 7,576 9,342 11,130 331% 2% 4% 
Spain 152 121 1,649 2,492 3,847 4,279 4,965 6,559 7,732 369% 1% 3% 
Belgium     4,828 5,013 5,272 6,249 7,156 0% 0% 3% 
Netherlands 2,875 2,045 4,768 5,132 5,371 5,220 5,250 5,943 6,644 39% 4% 2% 
World 42,271 50,822 112,236 162,871 207,093 203,820 211,765 236,035 269,473 140% 100% 100% 
Source: Morris, Barnes and Esselaar (2006, forthcoming) 
  
The quota system was essential to the global spread of industry.  The MFA had the 
consequence of fostering garment and textile industries in countries with limited 
comparative advantage, including some SSA countries. SSA is only a small participant 
on this global stage. Its share of global textile exports was only 2.6% in 2004, and 3.7% 
for clothing (WTO 2005). Most of these exports are destined for the USA and the 
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largest SSA clothing and textile exporter is Lesotho, followed by Madagascar, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa. (Table 3 below) 
 
The nature of competition in the apparel industry has also changed.  No longer does a 
factory compete with one that is down the road, but with one that is across an ocean.  
Developing countries producing textiles and clothing are competing against other 
developing countries, like China and India.  China’s exports of clothing have already 
increased to approximately a quarter of the world total since it joined the WTO in 2001 
(de Jonquieres, 2004).  Asian countries have a number of advantages in clothing and 
textiles.  China and other Asian countries have available at easy reach cheap, high-
quality fabric, produced in Asia (Robbins et al, 2004).  China has the ability to produce 
a growing range of items, and has improved its capacity in order to overcome barriers of 
international quality standards. Unfortunately for producers in SSA countries, prices of 
Asian-produced garments are declining, while Asian clothing exports are growing.  
China’s share of the US textiles and apparel market, which was about 22% in 2003, is 
expected to increase to between 65% and 75% after quotas are removed (ATMI, 2003).  
Developing countries such as Lesotho must keep in mind such competition when 
preparing a strategy for the future.   
 
On 31 December 2004, the MFA ended and with it, all quotas on textiles and clothing 
trade between member states of the WTO. Although the phasing down of the quotas had 
been planned as a gradual process spanning five years, importing countries back-loaded 
what products they would remove from quotas. Most chose to remove items in the first 
few years of the phase-out which were of little significance in their imports.  The 
removal of quotas did not mean a “level playing field” since global trade in clothing and 
textiles is still regulated by tariffs. It is important to note here that the Generalised 
System of Preference by which the US and 26 other developed countries provides duty-
free tariff preferences to over 100 beneficiary countries notably exclude clothing and 
textiles. In the case of the US, in 2001 the average weighted tariff for clothing was 
15.5%, but ranged from 13% to 17% for cotton products and 25% to 35% for synthetic 
products. 
2.1 Preferential Trade Access: African Growth and Opportunity Act 
 
Preferential trade access is the other major contributing factor to the spread of the 
garment industry.  The African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) was signed into 
USA law on 18 May 2000, aiming to assist SSA by using trade as a means of generating 
investment and employment. Thirty-six SSA countries, including Lesotho, are eligible 
for duty-free access to the United States under AGOA.  AGOA covers an additional 
1,800 tariff lines beyond the traditional US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
for special selected countries.  To be eligible for AGOA preferences, countries must 
meet certain eligibility criteria; countries must not engage in activities that undermine 
US national security or foreign policy interests especially in the areas of human rights 
and terrorism, for example (UNCTAD 2003).   AGOA’s major difference was the 
inclusion of clothing and textiles for duty-free access to the US; Lesotho and other SSA 
countries already had duty-free access under the US GSP for most other products.   
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Table 3: Clothing exports from selected SSA countries to the US and EU (US$m) 
 Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Mauritius South Africa Swaziland 
 US EU US EU US EU US EU US EU US EU 
1990 2.5 2.5 24.5 5.6 0.4 10.8 121.2 522.7 0.0 32.3 3.4  
1995 34.0 6.3 61.7 12.6 6.7 122.0 190.3 573.3 55.7 66.9 11.7  
2000 43.9 1.7 140.1 1.6 109.5 234.6 244.7 638.5 140.9 78.6 31.9 1.1 
2001 64.4 1.7 216.7 3.2 178.2 233.3 238.3 591.2 173.4 69.0 48.1 0.8 
2002 125.9 1.1 321.0 2.1 89.4 145.6 254.4 642.3 180.6 68.7 89.1 0.2 
2003 187.8 1.4 392.4 1.2 195.9 127.9 269.0 616.2 231.8 78.0 140.5 0.2 
2004 277.2 3.2 455.9 1.0 323.3 196 226.4 635.7 141.3 70.3 178.6 1.1 
2005 271  390.7  277  166  86.5  160.9  
Source: Gibbon (2002).  2003-2005 data from USITC, US Department of Commerce, Otexa, and Eurostat 
Note: US $ exchange rates based on rates for 31 December in the relevant year 
 
Table 3 shows the marked increase in clothing exports from AGOA beneficiaries.  
Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar and Swaziland all saw exports overall increase 
significantly in the period of 2000 through 2005. South Africa and Mauritius, due to the 
fact that they are not considered LDC countries and thus do not have access to third 
country fabric, did not see as significant a rise in exports.  Mauritius petitioned the US 
government to have access to third country fabric and was granted permission in 2004, 
but only through 2005.  
2.1.1 Rules of Origin and Third Country Fabric 
 
AGOA has strict rules of origin.  Garments must be made of 85% US-made yarn and 
fabric to enter the US duty-free or alternatively, from fabrics and yarns made in other 
AGOA beneficiary countries, but limited to a maximum of 3.5% of all US apparel 
imports (UNCTAD 2003).  For countries with a per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) of less than $1,500 in 1998 (i.e. LDC countries), the rules of origin requirement 
is relaxed even further: LDCs can import fabric for production from anywhere in the 
world (Olarreaga and Ozden 2005).  This provision is called the third country fabric 
provision.  The third country fabric provision was originally set to expire in September 
2004, but in August 2004, the provision was renewed until 30 September 2007.  This 
provision has been key to the rise of the industry in Lesotho.  In 2003, of all the apparel 
products shipped under AGOA to the US from eligible countries, 76% were exported 
using third country fabrics; only 19% of AGOA exports used local and regional fabrics, 
mostly SA producers (TRALAC 2004).   
 
Error! Reference source not found.Table 4 shows that since 2002, more than 90% of 
all clothing exports from Lesotho to the United States receive duty-free treatment.  
Exports qualify mainly because of the exception granted under the third country fabric 
provision.  South Africa and Mauritius (Error! Reference source not found.) have 
lower qualifying shares of exports due to the fact that they do not or did not have access 
to third country fabric.  Mauritius currently has a special derogation for third country 







Table 4: AGOA qualifying as share of total clothing exports to US, 2001 – 2003 (US$m) 
Country 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 
Lesotho 129.2 60.1 317.7 98.9 372.6 94.9 447.6 98.2 
Madagascar 92.1 51.8 75.4 84.4 186.3 94.9 314.5 97.3 
Kenya 51.7 80.0 121.3 96.6 176.2 93.9 271.5 97.9 
Mauritius 38.9 16.3 106.5 41.8 135.0 50.2 147.8 65.3 
Swaziland 8.2 17.1 73.7 82.7 126.9 90.2 175.6 98.3 
South Africa 30.4 17.4 85 46.9 126.6 54.5 114.7 81.2 
Source: Morris et al (forthcoming).  Data: US Department of Commerce, Otexa 
 
The third country fabric position is crucial for countries exporting to the US; it not be 
renewed in 2007, there could be significant consequences for manufacturers in AGOA 
countries.  To access AGOA benefits, sub-Saharan African countries would need to 
increase fabric production for SSA garment manufacturers exporting to the United 
States.  US fabric is prohibitively expensive, and African fabric is not of a high enough 
quality for export.  Although South Africa and Mauritius could expand their textile 
capacity, production would need to increase to meet demand (Coughlin et al, 2001).  
Large investments would be needed in the textile industry to update it enough to meet 
the lead times and product variety garment manufacturers need (Coughlin et al, 2001).  
According to manufacturers interviewed in Lesotho, fabric mills in sub-Saharan Africa 
do not provide the wide variety of fabric necessary to meet manufacturers’ needs.  
 
Production and export of clothing and textiles is concentrated in five SSA countries: 
Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Madagascar, South Africa, and to a lesser extent Swaziland.  
These six countries account for over 90% of African clothing exports (Gibbon 2002, 
2003).  AGOA has provided SSA countries with a valuable opportunity to industrialize 
as they have been shielded from open competition (Minor et al, 2002), and sub-Saharan 
African countries have taken advantage of this opportunity.  Exports from the region are 
mainly formerly quota-restricted low-price basic items such as trousers (typically jeans), 
t-shirts and sweaters that usually have long production runs, low labour value-added and 
few styling changes (USITC, 2004).   
2.2 Preferential Trade Access: EU’s Cotonou Agreement and EBA 
 
Under the Cotonou Agreement, exports from Lesotho have duty-free access to European 
Union markets but must meet strict rules of origin.  The Cotonou Agreement is 
currently being phased out.  Under current EU proposals, Lesotho and other lesser-
developed countries must choose between entering into an economic partnership 
agreement (EPA) with the EU, which is negotiated separately between a country and the 
European Union, or revert to preferences available under the Everything but Arms 
(EBA) initiative, which is part of the European Union’s GSP (Brenton, 2003).  The 
current rules of origin for the EBA are the same as under the Cotonou Agreement; it is 
difficult for Lesotho to export garments to the EU due to the stringent rules of origin.   
2.2.1 EU Rules of Origin 
 
Duty-free access to the EU is contingent upon a garment meeting the stringent rules of 
origin.  Under general preferential rules of origin, non-originating materials (i.e. 
imported yarn or fabric) must undergo “sufficient working or processing to confer unto 
the article a new origin of the product obtained” (Euratex, 1998).  A garment is subject 
to the principles of ‘cumulation,’ i.e. the garment must undergo two or more 
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manufacturing or transformational processes to qualify for duty-free access. In other 
words the garment must be made from fabric made in Lesotho.  The European Union 
publishes a list of the different processes that qualify a garment of duty-free access 
(Euratex, 1998).   
 
However, in the late 1980s Lesotho applied for and received a derogation of the rules of 
origin, which lasted for eight years (Salm et al 2002). The derogation attracted investors 
to Lesotho. Unfortunately, in 1997, the derogation from the EU expired and was not 
renewed.  As a result, some firms closed, while others switched to producing for the US 
market.   
 
Lesotho currently could export denim products to the EU as there is a denim fabric mill 
in Maseru.  It does not appear, however, that jeans manufacturers are taking advantage 
of this opportunity.  Knit manufacturers, due to the lack of a knit fabric mill, currently 
are unable to access the EU market duty-free. 
 
3 The Country: An Economic Overview of Lesotho 
 
Lesotho is a small, land-locked country in Southern Africa, completely surrounded by 
South Africa.  Lesotho’s population is 1.8 million (2003), but has negative population 
growth due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic (USITC 2005).  Lesotho in general has few 
natural resources; the country lies at a high elevation with little arable land.  In 2003, 
GDP was $1.1 billion, with an annual growth rate of 2.5%.   
 
Lesotho has relatively few exports.  Clothing was the major export in 2004, accounting 
for Lesotho’s major export in 2004 was clothing, accounting for 75% of total exports 
(Figure 1).   
 






















        Source: IMF (2005)  
 
Besides a concentration in exports, Lesotho has few trading partners.  The United States 
alone is the destination of 80% of Lesotho’s exports; 98% of which is clothing and 
textiles (Figure 2).  The next largest destination market is the South African Customs 
Union (SACU), of which South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland are 
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members.  In 2002 (the last year that figures are available), 18% of Lesotho’s GDP 
came from clothing and textiles (USITC 2004).  
















        Source: IMF (2005) 
 
Unemployment in Lesotho is high, estimated at 40-45% (USITC, 2005).  For years, 
people in Lesotho relied on remissions from male relatives who worked in the South 
African mines. But as the mines closed or down-sized, workers have returned home and 
have not been able to find employment; the clothing industry mainly employs women. 
3.1 History of the Garment Industry in Lesotho 
 
Lesotho in the late 1980s and early 1990s had competitive wages and production costs, 
attracting foreign investment from Asian firms who were seeking unfilled quotas as 
well as firms, both South African and Taiwanese, who left South Africa to avoid the 
restrictions placed on South Africa due to its apartheid regime.  Lesotho is the leading 
recipient (per capita) of FDI in the clothing industry among AGOA beneficiaries (Lall 
2005).  The majority of this investment comes from Taiwan.  Initial industrial garment 
production investment in Lesotho occurred in Maputsoe, the closest area of Lesotho to 
Durban and the port and also around Maseru, the capital.   
 
Table 5: Number of LNDC Assisted Garment Factories in Lesotho (1994-2004) 
  1994 1999 2004 2005 
Number of  
Factories 
6 21 47 39 
Number of  
Workers 
8600 (est.) 19,000 41,000 35,678 







The garment industry has grown steadily since the 1980s, from 21 firms in 1999 to 47 in 
2004 (Error! Reference source not found.).  More than 80% of clothing investors are 
Taiwanese – the rest are South African. Although the industry grew steadily, eight 
factories closed between June 2004 and December 2005, leaving 5,800 workers 
unemployed (USITC, 2005). Reasons for closures include volatility of the rand and the 
loss of orders due to increased competition and the end of textile and apparel quotas in 
2005.  An additional 6,150 were laid off as factories reduced their number of 
employees.  The net loss of jobs is only 10,700 however, as ten factories increased their 
employees by a total of 1,250.   
  9
 
In the last survey of the industry undertaken by the Lesotho National Development 
Corporation in July 2005, Lesotho currently has 39 clothing firms employing 35,678 
people (Table 6).   
 
Table 6: Total Firms and Employment in the Garment industry in Lesotho (as of July 2005) 
 No of Firms Employment 
Woven Firms 9 14,914 
Knit Firms 30 20,924 
Total 39 35,678 
         Source: LNDC, Interviews 
 
Table 6 also illustrates the importance of knit firms to the industry in Lesotho.  Knit 
firms comprise 77% of firms in the clothing industry and 60% of employment.  These 
firms are also the most vulnerable to the end of the third country fabric provision in 
September 2007 as they will no longer be able to import cheap fabric from Asian 
countries.  Nine woven firms are in a much more secure position for 2007 as they have 
access to the Formosa denim mill, a $100 million investment built in 2004 by the Nien-
Hsing group.   
 
The government currently offers various forms of assistance to the industry, which are 
discussed in further detail below.   
3.2 Lesotho’s Destination Markets 
 
Lesotho currently exports mostly to the US.  As discussed above, the rules of origin of 
the EU prevent Lesotho from taking advantage of duty-free access to the EU.  However, 
it would benefit Lesotho to diversify its export markets.  Lesotho was able to negotiate a 
derogation of the rules of origin of the EU, and the government might be able to 
negotiate a similar agreement in the future.  The EU market has several general 
characteristics that make it attractive to garment manufacturers.  Orders are generally 
smaller and more flexible than orders for the US market, allowing producers to fill in 
empty production capacity.  EU buyers also tend to be more flexible in case there is a 
problem with a shipment (Gibbon, 2003).   As an example, manufacturers in 
Madagascar have been able to access the EU duty-free and those who export to some 
extent to both markets are able to better balance their production capacity (Sedowski, 
2006).  It is important to remember that the EU market is not as unified as the US 
market.  Each country in the European Union has its own national retail chains, with 
few large, cross-border retailers.  Thus, orders destined for the EU are smaller than 
orders to the US; manufacturers would need more orders to fill the same production 
capacity. Manufacturers indicated in interviews that they are exploring exporting to the 
European Union.  Denim manufacturers, due to the presence of a denim fabric mill 
would be able to access the duty-free benefits offered by the EU.  Knit manufacturers, 
however, are disadvantaged as there is no local knit fabric mill, and any garments they 
export to the EU would be subject to duties.   
4 Changes since 1 January 2005 
  
Now that a full year has passed since the end of the MFA, the effects of the removal of 
quotas should be evident.  Overall AGOA exports fell by 16%, Madagascar’s by 6% 
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and Swaziland’s by 2%.  The major casualty of quota removal was South Africa, whose 
AGOA exports collapsed, virtually halving. By contrast, comparing similar product 
groupings, China’s exports to the US increased very rapidly during the same time 
period (Kaplinsky and Morris 2006). 
 
Total exports from Lesotho have gone down by 14%, decreasing from $456 million in 
2004 to $391 million in 2005 (Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Exports of Apparel from Lesotho to the United States (in US$) 
 2004 2005 % decrease 
Total Exports of 





Total Exports of 






Source: AGOA.info  
 
However, not only has total value of exports gone down, but the unit price received has 
also gone down.  Table 8 gives a comparison for the top five products in 2004 and 2005.  
For the top ten products that Lesotho produces, unit price received has gone down an 
average of 3.2%.  The top ten products has also decreased by 7.4%, while total exports 
have gone down by 14%, leading to the conclusion that exports in Lesotho are being 
concentrated into a few product categories.   
 
Table 8: Lesotho vs China; Top 5 Lesotho clothing exports to US, 2004 and 2005 
Item Lesotho 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change (%) 
 05/04 
Unit price change 
(%) 
 05/04 





  Lesotho China Lesotho China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 390,600,000 -14 112   0.53 1.0 0.8 8 16 
1 59,300,000 -9.3 215.3 -9.2 -57.5 1.42 1.7 1.5 1.8 5.5 
2 43,900,000 -16.7 82.5 12.8 -67.7 0.95 2.4 1.8 2.3 3.8 
3 39,300,000 36.1 138.2 -8.5 -45.1 1.58 1.8 2.2 1.7 3.5 
4 30,800,000 34.0 534.7 -4.6 -52.8 2.76 6.9 8.2 0.7 4.0 
5 12,000,000 -41.0 442.0 -9.9 -34.1 1.39 1.1 0.6 1.5 7.1 
Avg  Top 
10* 
24,500,000 -7.4 151.6 -3.2 -46.2 1.2 
 
1.8 1.5 3.2 7.7 
Item  
1 Women's Or Girls' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing Less Than 36 
Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
2 Men's Or Boys' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing Less Than 36 Percent 
By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
3 Men's Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Blue Denim 
4 Boys' Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Not Imported As Parts Of Playsuits, Blue Denim 
5 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Blue Denim 
* weighted average 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris (2006).  Data: http://www.usitc.gov.  Accessed November 2005. 
 
Lesotho mainly manufactures low cost, low value-added basic garments, mainly t-shirts 
and jeans.  I Lesotho exports just 11 different categories of clothing, while South 
African manufacturers export in 38 different categories (GDS 2004).  It is these specific 
groups of products that have faced increased competition from low-cost manufacturers 
in Asia after the expiration of the MFA quotas (MFAF 2005), putting Lesotho in a 
precarious position.   
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Although production and exports have been affected, this has not been as critical as the 
impact on employment. The effects of the end of the MFA on firm-mortality and 
employment loss have been much more severe and indeed have bordered on the 
catastrophic, particularly Lesotho and Swaziland (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Employment decline in clothing sector, 2004-05 
 2004 2005 % decline 
Kenya 34,614 31,745 9.3 
Lesotho 50,217 35,678 28.9 
South Africa 98,000 86,000 12.2 
Swaziland 32,000 14,000 56.2 
       Source: Kaplinsky and Morris 2006 
 
The scale of job losses between 2004 and 2005 is alarming.  It is not just the degree of 
job loss which is of concern, but the nature of the jobs which have gone. It mostly 
involves women, and the impact on their families is severe. For Lesotho, a country 
without alternative sources of employment, this employment decline has major poverty 
implications. But we also know from global experience that rapid economic growth can 
be a significant factor in reducing poverty levels, and the loss to both GDP and exports 
arising from a sharp contraction of the clothing sector will have a further negative 
impact on poverty levels. 
 
However, it would be misleading to blame the end of the MFA solely for the decrease in 
exports.  To what extent the end of the MFA is to blame and to what extent the 
appreciation of the Maloti/Rand is to blame for the decrease in exports is difficult to 
determine.  What is certain is that the appreciation of the currency has played a larger 
role in the decrease in exports for Lesotho than mentioned in other reports and generally 
accepted.    
 
5 Constraints and Coping Strategies of Manufacturers 
5.1 Constraints specific to Lesotho 
  
The major constraint that manufacturers face at this time is the exchange rate. Lesotho’s 
currency, the Maloti, is pegged 1:1 with the South African Rand.  Between 2000 and 
2002, when most of the manufacturers arrived in Lesotho, the exchange rate between 
the US dollar and the Maloti/Rand was at its most advantageous.  However, in mid-
2003, the Maloti/Rand started appreciating against the dollar, rising from R12 per $1 to 
R7.5 per $1 in 2004 to its current position in January 2006 at R6 to $1.  Figure 3 
illustrates this point.  According to the IMF, “the maloti’s sharp rise vis-a-vis the U.S. 
dollar resulted in a 23 percent real effective appreciation from end-2001 to mid-2005” 
(IMF 2005, 15).  The appreciating exchange rate has made it particularly difficult to 
remain competitive in the garment industry.   
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Source: www.reservebank.co.za.  Data accessed 5/5/2006 
 
Manufacturers have felt the appreciation in the Maloti/Rand most in the monthly wage 
bill.  As manufacturers are paid in dollars, the exchange rate plays an important part 
when manufacturers convert dollars to Maloti to pay local costs, including wages.  
Labour costs constitute the largest cost for manufacturers in Lesotho, but they also must 
pay for utilities, taxes, etc.  Manufacturers must now change twice as much dollars in 
maloti as they did in 2002, despite the fact that wages have not increased in real terms 
in the time period from 2000 to 2004 (Figure 4). 
   
Figure 4: Monthly Wages, 1998-2004 
 
Source: IMF (2005)  
As firm managers reported,  
“Our breakdown of costs is very unhealthy right now – our labour costs are too 
high, given our output” (Key Informant F).   
 
“Wages aren’t high, but they just look that way because of the currency.  It’s the 
currency that causes problems” (Key Informant G).   
 
The currency threshold for ‘breaking even’ is generally accepted as being R8 to $1: 
 “Currency is the problem.  We were fine at R12-13 per $1, even R8 per $1.  
That was fine, but now there is a problem, with R6 per $1” (Key Informant F). 
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 “If the currency drops back to 12-13 per $1, we can still compete with China, 
even without the third country fabric provision (Key Informant G).   
 
One factory manager made the point that at R12 to $1, minimum monthly wages of 
R643 in Lesotho are just $54, making Lesotho cheaper than China, which is reported to 
have wages around $60 per month.  Even at R8 per $1, monthly wages of R600 comes 
to $80, which is still acceptable.  But wages are approximately $107 per month, pricing 
them above the competition, mainly China and Vietnam.   
 
The USITC speculates that the exchange rate is one of the reasons that in 2004 investors 
for a knit fabric mill decided to drop their plans (USITC, 2005).   
 
5.2 Wages and Productivity 
 
Wages in Lesotho are set nationally by the government.  Wages in Lesotho are cheaper 
than wages in South Africa and equivalent for those in Swaziland.  Workers, by law, 
have vacation time and sick leave. Anecdotal evidence from interviews indicates that 
wages in Lesotho are higher than in China, Vietnam and Cambodia, giving anecdotal 
evidence to support this. Table 10 gives the monthly and hourly wage costs in rand and 
dollars.   
 
Table 10:  Monthly and Hourly Wages in Lesotho January 2006 
 Trainee Trained 
Monthly Wages R643 ($107) R686 ($114) 
Hourly Wages R3.31 ($0.55)* R3.53 ($0.59)* 
*Based on a monthly, full-time salary. Benefits are not included.  Exchange Rate: R6/$1 
Source: LNDC 
 
Wages are only one component of unit labour costs.  The other components are the 
degree of automation involved, the skills possessed by the labour force and the 
effectiveness of management. A detailed investigation of efficiency in Lesotho observed 
low levels of skill and efficiency (Salm et al, 2002). Middle management was 
particularly weak and was largely made up of Chinese workers with shop floor 
experience, but little management experience and largely unable to communicate with 
the labour force. They concluded that “operator productivity within the industry was 
generally low. This is principally due to deficient recruitment policies, inadequately 
trained operators, poor supervisory management, communication difficulties and cross-
cultural misunderstanding” (Salm et al 2002, 51).  Poor labour relations are part of this. 
A detailed survey of worker attitudes found that 51.3% of workers felt “very negative” 
towards their employers, and a further 14.3% felt “quite negative.” Only 1% felt “very 
positive.” Fifty-four percent felt that their lives had not improved at all since joining 
their factories, and a further 37% said that it had improved “only a little.” The 
overwhelming majority see Asian investors (their factory managers) in an extremely 
negative light” (Salm et al 2002, Annex 3, 21). 
 
Factory managers do not see workers and their productivity in a positive light either.  
Factory managers are generally negative regarding workers and their skill levels.  Low 
productivity was cited by firm managers interviewed as one of their major problems.  
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All manufacturers interviewed report worker productivity as being low in comparison to 
other countries like China, Cambodia, and Vietnam.   
 
“Workers aren’t motivated.  We’ve introduced training problems that have 
workers, but the improvements weren’t enough.  It’s hours that matter – workers 
produce less in the afternoon and at the end of the month” (Key Informant F). 
   
 “If workers aren’t skilled enough, buyers won’t come.  Yes, we do have training, 
skills have improved a lot in the last year.  But there are a lot of things [styles, 
techniques] that workers can’t do – the learning curve is very slow and many 
things [accessories] are so expensive (Key Informant B). 
 
Despite the fact that Lesotho has had a robust clothing industry for more than 10 years 
now, worker productivity is reported as still being low.  There are currently no training 
institutions in Lesotho, so firms must train workers when they are hired. There is a pool 
of skilled workers who have been laid off from other factories.  However, as AIDS-
related deaths increase as predicted, the pool of skilled workers will shrink while the 
demand will be grow as people become too sick to work.   
 
For Lall (2005) what is most worrying, is that productivity problems can no longer be 
considered ‘teething’ problems, faced by an industry at the beginning stages.  Factories 
have been in Lesotho long enough to have realised all possible economies in sewing, 
and the lack of productivity improvements is indicative of communication barriers 
between managers and factory workers, nonexistent training facilities, low worker 
skills, and a non-piece rate wage system (Lall 2005).   
 
5.3  Lack of Fabric Mills in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Although the lack of fabric mills is a constraint that will play a larger role come 2007 
when AGOA’s third country fabric provision expires, the current lack of a knit fabric 
mill is hindering access to the EU market as well as timely delivery to the US market.  
At present, Lesotho has a denim woven fabric mill, Formosa, in the Nien Hsing group, 
which produces for Nien Hsing’s factories in Lesotho.  However, 77% of the garment 
manufacturers in Lesotho require knit fabric.  Knit manufacturers must import fabric, 
waiting four to six weeks for the fabric to arrive from Asia.  The presence of a knit 
fabric mill in Lesotho would allow manufacturers to expand their product range into 
more time-dependent garments as their lead time would be much shorter.  Lesotho 
currently exports basic garments – jeans, t-shirts – as these products are not as time-
dependent.    
 
Although Southern Africa does have knit fabric mills, their annual production would not 
be enough to also fill the orders of factories in Lesotho, besides those of other Southern 
African countries (Coughlin et al, 2001).  Firms interviewed in Lesotho reported that 
knit fabric mills in South Africa have slow lead times, low quality levels, and high 
prices.  South African knit fabric mills take six weeks to deliver an order of fabric, just 
as long as it takes a knit fabric mill in China to make and deliver the same order 
(Source: Interviews).  South African mills at this time are not feasible options, nor do 
they have the capacity to produce for all of Lesotho’s needs. 
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Come 2007, the lack of a knit fabric mill Lesotho to meet the industry’s needs will have 
dire consequences.  No longer able to import fabric from Asia, firms will either lose 
duty-free access to the US and with it their 16% average tariff advantage, or they will be 
forced to buy costly fabric from African or US producers.   
 
“Without AGOA, the 17% tariff (on cotton goods), we would not have other 
advantages” (Key Informant C).   
 
Most manufacturers interviewed indicated that they would leave in 2007 should no knit 
fabric mill be built in Lesotho in the next year.  However, manufacturers are optimistic 
that the third country fabric provision will be extended.  Should the provision be 
extended, however, there will be even less of a chance that a knit fabric mill will be 
built. 
 
5.4 Transport Infrastructure: Implications for Lead times 
 
After the exchange rate and lack of local fabric, the next major problem faced by 
manufacturers is transport to and from ports.  Manufacturers in Lesotho have two 
options for transporting a container to the port.  The most used option is transport by 
road from Maseru or Maputsoe to Durban, the closest port.  Although this is the more 
expensive option, it is the fastest.  Rail is the second and cheaper option for transport to 
the port.  Containers leave from the Maseru Container Terminal and go via 
Bloemfontein to Port Elizabeth.  However, it can take nine to 20 days to transport a 
container by rail to the port (Table 11Error! Reference source not found.).  
Table 11: In-land Transport Options between Maseru and Port Elizabeth and Durban 
 Rail (Port Elizabeth) Road (Durban) 
Days 9-20 days 1-2 days 
Cost (40 ft container) R7,125 R9,500-12,500 
Source: World Bank (2004) 
 
Manufacturers also report delays at the border caused by South African Revenue 
Services taking longer than necessary to process a container.  The harbour at Durban is 
reported as being inefficient and overburdened, given the level of traffic.  “There are 
bottle necks at the harbour and the Lesotho border.  It can take 7-10 days to get a 
container through customs” (Key Informant D).   
 
These infrastructural problems take a heavy toll on firm lead times as Table 12 
demonstrates. Although Lesotho is no more disadvantaged relative to other SSA 
countries the length of these lead times severely penalises Lesotho as it competes with 
more productive firms in Asia.  Asian firms have a 30 day advantage as fabric mills are 
closer, and Asian firms are approximately only 14 days away from the ports on the west 
coast of the United States.   
 
“Our lead time is a minimum of 75-100 days.   In Cambodia, it’s 45-60 days.  
Buyers must plan ahead to order from us.  They are taking a high market risk if 
what they order [so far in advance] from us doesn’t sell well” (Key Informant 
F).   
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Table 12: Determinants of lead time – Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland 
DELIVERY TYPE KENYA LESOTHO SWAZILAND 
Delivery of fabric from 
Asia (Taiwan or China) 
30 days 30 days 
 
30 days 
From port to factory  7 days (Nairobi) 3 days 3~10 days 
Production lead-time 30 days 25 - 30 days 25~30 days 
Factory gate to port 3 days 3 day 2 days 
Port to U.S.A. Port 
(NY) 
40 days  
Mombassa to NY 
28 days 
Durban to NY 
28 days 
Durban to NY 
Total delivery time 110 days  90 – 100 days  90~100 days 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris 2006 
 
The most important issue regarding transport is that transport itself is not the problem, 
but that importing the fabric from China causes a delay of a minimum of 30 days, a 
delay that construction of a knit fabric mill would decrease.   
5.5 Infrastructural Constraints: Water 
 
The industry is hampered by a lack of water.  Low water pressure and unacceptable 
water quality were reported as problems experienced by manufacturers.  One 
manufacturer reported not having enough water for even the employees’ toilets.  The 
government’s Inter-ministerial Task Team has been trying to address these problems 
since 2004.  However, three firms reported continuing problems with water costs and 
service. One of the clothing firms in Lesotho had to close 13 out of 23 lines in 2004 due 
to water shortages and another Lesotho firm also observed poor water supplies as a 
handicap to production, along with power outages. 
 
Water availability and service must be improved to attract knit fabric mill investment.  
If water availability is a major constraint now, the situation will only deteriorate should 
a knit mill be built, as vast quantities of water are necessary for washing and dying.  
5.6 International Constraints: Falling Prices 
 
One of the most pronounced effects of the end of the MFA is the global decrease in 
prices received by manufacturers for garments.  All firms in Lesotho reported receiving 
lower prices for the same garment in 2005 than in 2004.  Firms reported price drops of 
between 5-20%.  Table 13 shows two items for which exact prices were reported.   
Table 13: Firm-reported price drops 2004-2005 
 Price received 2004 Price received 2005 % decrease 
Item: t-shirt $3.00 per dozen $2.20-2.40 per dozen 20-26% 
Item: synthetic 
pants $21.00 per dozen $9.50 per dozen 55% 
 
When prices drop, it is difficult for manufacturers to turn a profit as bottom line costs 
have not changed.  Indeed, one of the largest costs manufacturers face in Lesotho is 
labour costs, which increase each year.  The increase in costs combined with the 
decrease in prices received, places manufacturers in a difficult position, making them 
more likely to close down or lay off workers.   
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6 Government Action 
 
“Without government, Lesotho can’t survive.  It would be a disaster without 
government.  Without government support, we wouldn’t be here otherwise.” (Key 
Informant C) 
 
“Government is very supportive of the industry.  We have monthly meetings with the 
government; they are very easy to talk to.  There is the Inter-ministerial Task Force that 
we talk to.”   (Key Informant A)  
 
In comparison to other SSA countries assistance to garment industrialists, Lesotho’s 
government has been and is the most proactive in supporting the vital clothing and 
textile industry of the other AGOA beneficiary countries.  Government can play an 
important role in supporting an industry and encouraging factories to stay.  One of the 
primary competitive benefits of Chinese industry is the efficiency with which the 
infrastructure functions. This includes not just physical infrastructure such as roads, 
water and power, but also bureaucratic infrastructure such as port clearance, enterprise 
set-up and the delivery of appropriate certification. Many of the AGOA economies are 
fully aware of this. Yet in most cases policy response is cumbersome, and action is 
slow. Amongst the countries in SSA with garment industries, research undertaken has 
found that manufacturers in Lesotho were most favourably disposed towards the 
government support which they received. They felt that they had ready access and an 
open ear in government. Although not all of their problems were solved (for example, 
water shortages), the general response from government was conducive to enhanced 
investments, such as the new $100 million denim fabric mill. Below the important 
strategies undertaken by the government are discussed.  
  
6.1 Lesotho National Development Corporation 
 
The major government vehicle for support of the clothing and textile industry is the 
Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC).  The LNDC is considered to be 
the driving force behind the growth of the garment industry.  The LNDC manages the 
industrial estates as well as the investment process of investors considering investing in 
Lesotho.  Two industrial estates are located north of Maseru in Maputsoe and Ha 
Nyenye, and two in Maseru (Thetsane and Maseru West Industrial Estate).   
 
According to the 2002 DFID report, the LNDC has attracted investors to Lesotho as 
well as “reassured them through difficult times and assisted them in expanding their 
businesses.”  The LNDC offers as services company registration, assistance in acquiring 
the proper licenses and permits, investor counselling, and assistance in industrial 
(union-firm) relations (LNDC 2006).  The LNDC has attracted investors using the 
incentives of relatively cheap and well-educated labour, and a 15% tax rate compared to 
35% that most businesses pay, and subsidized wages during a designated training period 
(Source: Interviews, Salm et al, 2002).  Firm owners report that the LNDC is helpful 
and responsive when assisting firms with any problems.  The LNDC interacts on a 
frequent basis with industrialists to ensure that problems industrialists have are being 
addressed to the fullest extent possible, though capacity and funding within the LNDC 
is a problem.   
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When there is a problem on a LNDC industrial estate, it appears from interviews with 
firms that the LNDC is relatively quick in solving the problem.  There is a shortage of 
factory shells however.  Firms that chose to occupy factory shells not built by the 
LNDC have found it difficult in getting the LNDC to assist them when they face 
problems, particularly with utility problems like water and electricity availability and 
cost.  As an example, however, firms reported financial problems due to the 
appreciation of the Maloti/Rand, and the LNDC responded by decreasing rents in 
LNDC-owned factory shells by 10% (Key Informant I).   
 
6.2 Taking Care of Bureaucracy: Inter-ministerial Task Team 
 
In 2004, the Ministry of Industry, Trade, Marketing and Cooperatives encouraged the 
creation of an inter-ministerial committee to discuss the needs and problems garment 
manufacturers were facing, given that 2005 would be a difficult year due to the end of 
the MFA.  The Inter-ministerial Task Team was created in July 2004, with the final 
report adopted in September 2004.  The ministries involved in the task team included 
the ministries of Employment and Labour; Finance and Development Planning; Home 
Affaires and Public Safety; Local Government; Natural Resources; Public Works and 
Transport; and Trade and Industry, Marketing and Cooperatives.  Other government 
representatives were involved, including the Central Bank of Lesotho, the Lesotho 
National Development Corporation and Lesotho’s national utility companies, among 
others.  Industry was represented by selected firms and industry organizations.  It is 
important to note also that government was in dialogue with the industrialists in Lesotho 
before the Inter-ministerial Task Team was established (Key Informant I), although now 
procedures for solving problems have been formalised. 
6.3 Increasing Productivity: Training 
  
The government of Lesotho offers a tax rebate for industrialists on their training costs: 
100% of staff training costs are tax deductible.   Industrialists interviewed stated that 
this was a helpful government program.  Additional assistance for training costs is also 
available via ComMark Trust, a non-governmental organization working with the 
LNDC.  ComMark Trust provides up to three years of subsidies for training costs.  The 
first year, ComMark Trust provides a 50% training subsidy, decreasing to 45% in the 
second year and 40% the third year.  ComMark Trust provides a list of approved 
training companies, who can train industrialists in production processes, productivity, 
human resources and cultural assimilation (ComMark Trust, no date).   
 
Factory managers interviewed reported taking advantage of the training programs 
offered by the ComMark Trust.  One firm of the seven interviewed reported important 
productivity gains after the training; two firms, however, stated that although high 
levels of productivity were achieved during the training program, once the training 
program was completed, productivity dropped again (although to a level somewhat 
better than before the training program).   
 
In addition, to receive duty-credit benefits, manufacturers must invest in a minimum 
amount in training, depending on the category the company falls into.  The amount 
spent must either be 5% of the annual wage bill or 10% of the value of the duty-credit 
certificate when training the workforce of CMT operations (ComMark Trust 2003).   
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6.4 Attracting buyers: Government lobbying for the industry 
 
The government has also assisted firms by lobbying for the industry.  A delegation of 
government officials and industry representatives went to the United States in January 
and February 2005 to visit the US Congress and the Bush Administration to impress 
upon them the importance of the AGOA program to the industry in Lesotho.  In 
addition, the government officials met with representatives of the major brands that 
source from Lesotho, including Gap and Levi Strauss to impress upon them their 
importance to the industry.  
 
The government is also currently involved in the industry by taking industrialists with 
them whenever they visit buyers or attend trade shows in other countries.  The 
government is working with the industrialists to expand their product lines (Key 
Informant I).  Knit fabric producers have been invited by government to tour Lesotho so 
as to see the opportunity that knit manufacturers offer (Key Informant I).   
 
The Government of Lesotho is also involved with Angola, Tanzania and other African 
countries in renegotiating the rules of origin for garments for access to the European 
Union (Key Informant I).  It is unknown at this time the outcome or progress of the 
negotiations.   
6.5 Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS) 
 
All the firms interviewed cited the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS) as the major 
reason why they had not relocated after the appreciation of the rand and the end of the 
MFA.   
          FOB versus CMT 
• FOB (Free-on-board): the 
manufacturer must buy all the 
fabric and trims itself from 
suppliers.  The manufacturer 
takes ownership of the raw 
materials.   
• CMT (cut, make trim): indicates 
that all the raw materials 
needed (fabric and trims) arrive 
in the container, and 
manufacturer in Lesotho 
assembles the final product. 
The goods still belong to the 
supplier, not the manufacturer.
“We would have left already if it hadn’t been for 
the DCCS” (Key Informant E).   
 
 “Factories have only been able to survive because 
of the DCCS.  They changed from CMT to FOB 
so they would increase the value-added” (Key 
Informant G).   
 
The DCCS is a rebate of the duty to be paid on the 
importation of clothing and textile products. “The duty 
credit is the value by which import duty can be reduced 
and is based on the value of goods exported which have 
been manufactured in Lesotho during a specified period” (ComMark Trust 2005). 
 
The DCCS was introduced in March 2003 to run until March 2005, but it was renewed 
for an additional four years.  DCCS was conceptualised by the government to encourage 
exporters to upgrade from being a CMT firm to a FOB firm (see box).  Currently, most 
of the manufacturers in Lesotho are CMT firms, meaning that they only assemble the 
fabric and trims that arrive in a container from the client.  CMT firms receive less of a 
benefit than FOB firms.  By becoming FOB, firms can get 4.5-6% extra revenue on 
their turnover versus 3.4-4.5% for CMT firms (Maloney 2006).  This is a valuable 
advantage when profit margins are sinking in the face of international downward price 
pressures.  Three firms interviewed mentioned switching from CMT status to FOB 
status to take advantage of the higher duty-credit benefit.  However, at the same time, 
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these firms took on more risk, as now they must have the lines of credit available to 
purchase the necessary fabric and trims, as well as liaise frequently with the buyer on 
acceptable fabric and trim suppliers (Key Informant H).   
 
Although the DCC benefit that Lesotho pays out comes from Lesotho’s share of the 
SACU revenue pool, government feels that the increase in economic growth attributable 
to the clothing industry more than makes up for the decrease in revenues (Inter-
ministerial Task Team 2004).   
 
However, one must keep in mind that the DCCS is just a temporary support measure 
that provides little incentive to upgrade.  Firms do not seem to be using the breathing 
space provided by the DCCS to train their workers or upgrade their  
6.6 Government Financial Supports: Corporate Tax Rate and (Proposed) 
Wage Subsidy 
 
In February 2006, the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Timothy 
Thahane, announced the lowering of the company tax on clothing firms from 15% to 
0% to “to help support the recovery in our textile and clothing industry and to 
encourage diversification of exports” (Thahane 2006).  It is unknown what effect this 
late stage effort will have, if for example it will attract new factories or encourage 
current ones to expand.  But this does show that the government of Lesotho is aware of 
the problems the industry is facing and is trying different support mechanisms to see 
which are the most effective.   
 
The Inter-ministerial Task Team also has considered granting a wage subsidy for 
exporters, tied to the exchange rate.  If the Maloti/Rand falls below R7.5 per US dollar, 
the government would provide a subsidy for as long as the rate stays below the base rate 
(Inter-ministerial Task Team, 2004).  However, since it was first proposed in 2004, no 
further action has been taken.   
 
6.7 Trade and Investment Facilitation Centre: the ‘one-stop shop’  
 
The Trade and Investment Facilitation Centre, currently being set up by the Inter-
ministerial Task Team, involves the MTICM, the Lesotho Revenue Authority (LRA), 
and the LNDC, with the support of the banks.  The Centre is supposed to “seamlessly 
manage the issuance of import and rebate permits by the MTICM, and the clearance of 
goods by the LRA” (Inter-ministerial Task Team 2004).  In addition, the Centre would 
assist factory management in obtaining residence permits and visas for required 
personnel; a problem that industrialists have said has hindered their efficiency.  The 
Centre is also expected to reduce the time that it takes to register a new business in 
Lesotho from 90 days to 25 days with expedited processing.  Although factories 
mentioned in interviews that the situation with visas and residence permits has 
improved, the Centre is not yet fully operational, despite the fact that it is highly 
demanded and relatively easy to set up.   
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7 Future Challenges for Manufacturers in Lesotho 
 
The world does not hold constant.  Not only must manufacturers in Lesotho contend 
with current changes in the global value chain such as increased importance of lead 
times and the end of the quota system, but there are changes on the horizon that will 
again affect the industry as a whole. 
 
Countries benefiting from the AGOA regime have special access to the American 
market, but they are not the only poorer, garment-producing countries to have 
privileges.  Currently, Israel, Jordan and Mexico benefit from similar agreements.  
There is no guarantee that these benefits will remain unique.  For example, after the 
tsunami in December 2004, duty-free trade benefits were extended to tsunami-affected 
countries, although not for garments.  The US Central America Free Trade Agreement 
also extended duty-free benefits to countries in Central America, but the rules of origin 
for garments are quite strict.  However, this trend of duty-free access as an economic 
incentive for poor countries points to trade erosion.   
  
Not only is trade erosion a problem on a trade agreement basis, but also on the 
international level.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) has a schedule to regularly 
reduce tariffs internationally amongst its members.  For example, AGOA exporters 
currently have the average tariff advantage of 16% on garments.  However, if the WTO 
requires its members to reduce tariffs on all products, this advantage will erode, 
decreasing the advantage that AGOA exporters have over others.  
 
The government of Lesotho appears to be realistic about its situation.  It understands 
that without the clothing industry and the money it pumps into the local economy, the 
only alternative would be for the government to pay unemployment benefits (Adbelal et 
al, 2006).  This strategy will buy time until Lesotho can diversify its exports by 
attracting investors in horticulture, sandstone and tourism (Abdelal et al, 2006).   
  
7.1 Market Opportunities: The European Union 
 
The European Union is a market that is largely untapped by manufacturers in Lesotho. 
Lesotho has duty-free access to the EU market, although stringent rules of origin must 
be met.  European countries used to represent a large portion of Lesotho’s garment 
exports; however, since the mid-1990s and the expiration of the special derogation of 
the EU’s rules of origin, manufacturers have not exported to the EU in large quantities. 
 
The main reason that manufacturers have not taken advantage of the EU market is due 
to the EU rules of origin.  Products must undergo a certain amount of value-added 
within the country, but is usually described as a double transformation rule, as two 
transformation (from yarn to fabric, and fabric to garment) must be done in country to 
ensure enough value-added to receive duty-free access.   
 
The current trade regime, the Cotonou Agreement, is about to expire.  The Lesotho 
government must choose to be considered under the Everything but Arms (EBA) 
initiative, which has the same rules of origin as the Cotonou Agreement, or 
alternatively, negotiate with the EU bilaterally for an Economic Partnership Agreement 
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(EPA).  Lesotho at one time was able to negotiate a derogation of the rules of origin and 
may possibly be able to do the same in the future.  However, it must be understood that 
the EU does not represent a unified market like the United States, with one or two large, 
dominant retailers.  The EU market is divided by country, with few pan-European retail 
chains.   
 
The government, although it understands that the garment industry is important for 
Lesotho in terms of employment and exports, also realizes that it is dangerous to rely 
entirely on one industry.  Although the government is pursuing a fairly active strategy in 
assisting the clothing and textile industry, it must also devote energies to diversifying 
the export base of Lesotho.   
7.2 Vertical Integration: A Knit Fabric Mill 
 
The key to securing Lesotho’s future would be the presence of a knit fabric mill in 
Lesotho. However, the obstacles to the set up of a knit fabric mill in Lesotho are many.  
First, few investors would be willing to take the risk of investing in a knit fabric mill in 
Lesotho.  Fabric mills are capital-intensive enterprises; Formosa, the denim fabric mill 
in Lesotho, for example, is a $100 million investment.  The investment required for a 
knit fabric mill would be along similar lines. 
 
Lesotho at this time would be hard-pressed to attract a knit fabric mill.  Water 
availability, pressure and treatment are important for fabric dying and washing.  Lesotho 
is barely equipped to handle the needs of its current factories.  A water treatment plant 
would need to be built in order to attract a knit fabric mill.  Even with a knit fabric mill, 
there is no guarantee that it would provide the more than 60 different types of fabric that 
producers need (USAID 2005).   
 
Finally, AGOA’s third country fabric provision might be renewed in 2007, thereby 
negating the need for a knit fabric mill in Lesotho.  The only benefit a knit mill would 
provide (in the third country fabric provision is renewed) is shorter lead times; no 
longer would firms need to source from China, causing a delay of eight weeks. 
 
It is important to note that the government is not inclined to have the AGOA third 
country fabric provision set to expire in September 2007 renewed.  It sees the expiry as 
an opportunity to bring in knit mill investment.  However, due to the precarious 
situation that most knit manufacturers find themselves, it appears that government, 
investors and manufacturers are looking to see who will make the first move.   
7.3 Market ‘Lesotho: the Brand’ 
 
Buyers and retailers are very sensitive to image and the importance of corporate social 
responsibility.  Because of the labour, environmental and social laws in place, the 
working conditions in Lesotho are not nearly as exploitative as conditions found in 
Asian countries.  The government of Lesotho should do more to promote Lesotho as a 
destination of choice for buyers and retailers concerned about labour and environmental 
standards.  Workers in Lesotho do not experience the same sweatshop conditions as 
reported to exist in Asian countries.  A campaign that offers Lesotho as an alternative to 
sweatshop conditions in other countries could benefit Lesotho.  Investment promotion 
agencies are standard practise for newly industrialising countries and Lesotho could use 




A number of conclusions can be drawn from Lesotho’s experience: 
  
1. The significance of China’s global economic expansion cannot be 
underestimated in terms of its impact on Lesotho’s clothing and textile industry 
 
2. The major competitive threats to the industry therefore lie in the developing 
world and not in the industrialised world. In other words, a levelling of the 
playing fields, i.e. extending trade advantages to all developing countries, is not 
to Lesotho’s advantage.  Besides Asia, Lesotho is competing to some extent 
with Latin American countries that also manufacture garments, and that may 
receive the similar benefits to those that Lesotho receives under AGOA.  
 
3. Given the rapid growth of the garment sector in Lesotho and its importance to 
output, balance of payments, job creation, and income distribution, any changes 
will have significant repercussions with respect to high unemployment and 
serious poverty observed in the country.   
 
4. The existence of preferential access granted to Lesotho to the United States 
market via AGOA, including the third country fabric provision is a necessary 
condition for Lesotho’s clothing and textile industry. Without duty free access to 
Lesotho’s major market, the United States, the clothing industry is likely to 
suffer severely. Lall (2005) predicts that the other problems Lesotho faces are 
minor in comparison to the potential loss of tariff advantages.   
 
5. Foreign investment in Lesotho remains shallow (Lall 2005).  Taiwanese 
investors are relatively mobile and can leave.  Few if any backward linkages 
have been created, i.e. Basotho start-up firms supporting the clothing industry by 
providing cardboard boxes or dying facilities.  Government could act by 
supporting training institutions, small enterprises, and encouraging foreign 
investors to create local linkages. 
 
6. The sustainability of the industry however requires a major improvement in the 
production capabilities of firms in the industry. Without a major upgrading 
program which assists clothing firms to become more internationally 
competitive the industry will not be able to compete effectively with Asian 
producers.  It is essential that firms start adopting world class manufacturing 
standards and processes.  Government proposals to assist firms should include 
firm learning, worker training, and clustering.  A cluster approach would allow 
firms to learn better techniques from each other and help the industry develop 
further.  Firms must adopt a more active role to cement their position in Lesotho 
and in the global apparel value chain.   
 
7. However, the adoption of world class manufacturing standards is not the only 
requirement.  Such action must be complemented by the improvement in 
infrastructure, both physical and bureaucratic.  The improvement of the physical 
infrastructure, in particular the water system and a water treatment plant, is 
essential for attracting knit fabric mill investors and thus the creation of an 
integrated value chain within Lesotho.   
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8. An integrated value chain would allow Lesotho to enhance its competitiveness 
against its Asian rivals.  Integration, specifically the introduction of a knit fabric 
mill to Lesotho, will give the country an extra advantage in terms of lead times 
and access to the US market should the third country fabric provision expire in 
September 2007.   
 
9. Bureaucratic infrastructure needs to be improved to smooth customs clearances, 
company registration, and visa and residency permit applications.  This will 
hopefully disappear with the introduction of the Trade and Investment 
Facilitation Centre.  The specific conditions in Lesotho play an important role in 
determining whether or not firms are able to remain competitive in the global 
apparel market.   
 
10. The existing exchange rate tied to the South African Rand does not assist the 
Lesotho exporters of clothing who will find it very difficult to compete without 
high degrees of preferences in global markets.   
 
11. We have not yet seen the full impact of China on Lesotho. The effects we 
observe are still at a nascent stage of China’s expansion post MFA. It may well 
be that as China’s expansion continues and other factors intersect with the 
above, there may be even greater impacts. The best that the firms in Lesotho can 
do is to prepare themselves for tremendous international pressure and 








Abdelal, Rawi, Regina Abrami, Noel Maurer, and Aldo Musacchio (2006).  “The Market and the 
Mountain Kingdom: Change in Lesotho’s Textile Industry.”  Harvard Business School Case 
Study N9-706-043.   
 
AGOA.info (2005).  “Country Information: Lesotho.”  Accessed online at 
http://www.agoa.info/index.php?view=country_info&country=ls
 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute –ATMI (2003), “The China Threat to World Textile and 
Apparel Trade”, www.atmi.org
Brenton, Paul (2003).  “Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World Trading System: The 
Current Impact of EU Preferences under Everything But Arms.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3018.   
 
ComMark Trust (2003).  “Report on the Productivity Audit and Training Needs Analysis for the Garment 
Industry in Lesotho.”  ComMark Trust: Lesotho 
 
ComMark Trust (no date).  “ComMark’s Co-financing of Training Scheme Essential Elements.”  
Obtained from the ComMark Office in Lesotho.   
 
Commission of the European Communities (2003), “The future of the textiles and clothing sector in the 
enlarged Europe”. 
 
Coughlin, Peter, Musa Rubin and L. Amedée Darga (2001).  “Constraints & Opportunities: Myopia or 
Global Vision?” Study commissioned by SADC 
 
de Jonquieres, G. (2004), “The textile revolution”, Financial Times, London, UK. 
 
Kaplinsky R. and M. Morris (2006), Dangling by a thread: Can SSA survive the Chinese scissors?, 
Report prepared for DFID, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Euratex (1998).  “Rules of Origin for Textile Product Imports to the European Union.” Accessed online at 
http://www.euratex.org
 
Gereffi, G. (1999), “International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain”, 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp 37-70. 
 
Gereffi, Gary and Olga Memedovic (2003).  The Global Apparel Value Chain: What prospects for 
upgrading by developing countries.  Vienna: UNIDO.   
 
Gibbon, Peter (2002).  “South Africa and the Global Commodity Chain for Clothing: Export Performance 
and Constraints.” CDR Working Paper 02.7.  Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research.   
 
Gibbon, Peter (2003).  “The African Growth and Opportunity Act and the Global Commodity Chain for 
Clothing.” World Development 31(11), pgs 1809-1827.   
 
Global Development Solutions (2004).  Market Analysis of Selected Strategic Sectors in Lesotho. 
(Volume 1: Desk Study).  Report prepared for the World Bank.   
 
Inter-ministerial Task Team (2004). “Attracting and Maintaining Foreign Direct Investment in Lesotho’s 
Textiles and Apparel Industry.”  Government Working Document C3(2004/6) 188, September 
2004.   
 
International Monetary Fund (2005).  “Kingdom of Lesotho: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix.” 
IMF Country Report No. 05/438.  Accessed online at www.imf.org 
 
Kaplinsky, Raphael (2005).  Globalisation, Poverty and inequality: Between a rock and a hard place. 
Polity Press, London.   
  26
 
Lall, Sanjaya (2005).  “FDI, AGOA and Manufactured Exports by a Landlocked, Least Developed 
African Economy: Lesotho.”  Journal of Development Studies 41(6), pgs 998-1022. 
 
LNDC (2006).  Lesotho National Development Corporation website.  Accessed online 17 January 2006.   
 
Maloney, Christopher (2006).  All Dressed Up With No Place to Go?:Lesotho’s Rollercoaster Experience 
With Apparel.  Diss. Harvard University.   
 
 
McCormick and Schmitz (2002).  A Manual for value chain research on homeworkers in the garment 
industry.  Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.   
 
Minor, P.J., Velia, M. and Huges, J.K. (2002), “Assessing the potential for South African clothing exports 
to the United States and how the DTI and the South African clothing industry could best ensure 
that this is maximised”, Research Report to the South African Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI). 
 
Morris, Mike, Justin Barnes and Jeanne Enselaar (forthcoming).  “Globalisation, the Changed global 
Dynamics of the Clothing and Textile Value Chains and the Impact on sub-Saharan Africa.”  In 
Global Value Chains and Production Networks: Prospects for Upgrading by Developing 
Countries.  Vienna: UNIDO Publications 
 
Multifibre Alliance Forum (MFAF) (2005).  “Raising Competitiveness and Labour Standards within the 
Lesotho Garment Industry in the post-MFA Era.”  MFAF Report.  October 2005.  Accessed 
online at http://www.mfa-forum.net/
 
Nordas, H. K. (2004), “The global textile and clothing industry post the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing”, World Trade Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
Olarreaga, Marcelo and Caglar Ozden, “AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent in the 
Presence of Preferential Market Access?,” World Economy, January 2005, pages 63-77. 
 
Robbins, G., Todes, A. and Velia, M. (2004), “Firms at the crossroads: The Newcastle-Madadeni clothing 
sector and recommendations on policy responses.” An Initiative of the KZN DEDT and 
Newcastle Municipality. 
 
Salm, A., W. J. Grant, T. J. Green, J. R. Haycock and J. Raimondo (2002), Lesotho Garment Industry 
Subsector Study for Government of Lesotho, Department for International Development. 
 
Sedowski, Leanne (2006).  Hanging by a Thread? : The post-MFA Competitive Dynamics of the Clothing 
Industry in Madagascar.  Diss. University of KwaZulu-Natal.   
 
Rural Urban Integration Consultants Maseru (RUICON) (2004).  Lesotho Industrialisation: An Overview.  
Report prepared for the Premier Economic Advisory Council (PEAC), Free State Province.   
 
Thahane, Timothy (2006).  “Results do Matter: Budget Speech to Parliament for the Fiscal Year 2006/7.” 
Speech to Parliament, 8 February 2006.  Maseru.   
 
World Bank (2004).  “Value Chain Analysis of selected strategic sectors in Lesotho: A Field Study.  
Prepared for the World Bank by Global Development Solutions.  Delivered June 2004.   
 
UNCTAD (2003).  Main recent initiatives in favour of least-developed countries in the area of 
preferential market access: Preliminary impact assessment.  Geneva: UNCTAD Secretariat 
official note.  Document TD/B/50/5 
 
USAID (2005). The Elimination of Quotas under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Clothing 
and Textiles: The Impact on Lesotho.  Report prepared by Chemonics International.  Accessed 
online at http://www.satradehub.org/ 
 
  27
USITC (2004).  The Economic Effects of significant US import restraints: Fourth Update.  United States 
International Trade Commission Publication 3701.  Accessed online at www.usitc.gov 29 
January 2005.   
 
USITC (2005) Export Opportunities and Barriers in African Growth and Opportunity Act-eligible 
Countries.  United States International Trade Commission Publication 3785.  Accessed online at 
www.usitc.gov 12 December 2005. 
 
WTO (2005), International Trade Statistics, Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
 
 
  28
